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Surveillance of measles virus detected an epidemio-
logic link between a refugee from Kenya and a Dutch
tourist in New Jersey, USA. Identical genotype B3
sequences from patients with contemporaneous cases in
the United States, Canada, and Mexico in November and
December 2005 indicate that Kenya was likely to have
been the common source of virus.
I
dentification of measles virus genotypes is a valuable
tool for epidemiologic investigations and evaluation of
control activities in countries that have eliminated indige-
nous measles. Many of the 23 recognized genotypes of
measles are associated with countries or regions with
endemic measles (1). Measles genotypes in clade B (geno-
types B1, B2, B3) are associated with endemic circulation
of measles in various countries in sub-Saharan Africa (2).
The prototype clade B viruses were isolated in 1983 in
Cameroon (B1) and in 1984 in Gabon (B2). Hanses et al.
(3) proposed a new genotype, B3, after characterization of
several viruses collected in 1997 and 1998 in Ghana and
Nigeria. Sequencing studies of additional viruses from
Africa demonstrated that the proposed subdivision of the
B3 viruses into subgroups B3.1 and B3.2 was epidemio-
logically useful for describing 2 distinct clusters of con-
temporary B3 viruses (4,5).
Because measles is highly infectious, international trav-
el originating from measles-endemic areas can result in
sporadic cases of measles in countries that have eliminat-
ed indigenous transmission. International visitors may
infect other travelers while moving through transportation
hubs or tourist areas; such cases would not be detected
unless the traveler sought medical attention or additional
cases were detected. Thus, in many of these instances, the
source of virus is unknown. We describe the contribution
of global surveillance for measles virus genotypes in iden-
tifying a common source of virus among contemporaneous
cases identified in the United States, Canada, Mexico, and
the Netherlands.
The Study
On November 9, 2005, a 17-year-old man who arrived
at the airport in Newark, New Jersey, United States, had
symptoms consistent with measles. The man was part of a
group of 148 refugees from the Eastleigh community in
Nairobi, Kenya, who arrived in the United States from
November 3 through 15. Genotype B3 (subgroup B3.1)
was identified from virus samples from this patient; the
sequence was identical to sequences from measles viruses
collected in Nairobi and Machakos, Kenya, in October
2005 (Figure). All but 1 of the 6 viruses collected from
Nairobi (Figure, MVi/Nairobi.KEN.xx.05) were from
patients from the Eastleigh area of Nairobi, where an out-
break of measles had been reported in the Somali and
Ethiopian communities (6).
Also in November 2005, a single case of measles was
reported in the Netherlands. This patient had visited New
York City, returned to the Netherlands on November 15,
noted a rash on November 23, and was hospitalized with
pneumonia and fever on November 24. The initial investi-
gation focused on potential settings where exposure may
have occurred in New York City. The source of infection
was traced to an unrecognized exposure to the patient in
New Jersey only after analysis of the Netherlands viral
sequence demonstrated complete identity with the New
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logic link between the 2 cases led to the discovery that the
Dutch visitor had arrived at the Newark airport on
November 9 and waited in the arrival area for 1 h, along
with the group of refugees from Nairobi.
Subsequently, genotype B3 was identified from patients
who had had measles during December 2005 in Texas,
Canada, and Mexico. In Texas, during the first 2 weeks of
December, 3 cases of measles were reported in members of
a family from Houston. The patients had flown directly
from Houston to the resort area of Cabo San Lucas,
Mexico, where they stayed from November 22 through 27.
In Mexico, health authorities reported 5 cases of measles
beginning on December 12 among baggage handlers and
other airport workers at the Mexico City airport. In New
Brunswick, Canada, a patient developed a rash on
December 19.
Although the earlier cases in New Jersey and in the
Netherlands could be traced directly to the outbreak in
Kenya, the sources of the cases in Texas, Canada, and
Mexico were unknown. However, the sequences from
Texas, Canada, and Mexico were identical to the
sequences directly linked to the outbreak in Kenya
(Figure). Measles viruses in the same chain of transmis-
sion have identical sequences (7,8), which indicates that
the source of the virus for the cases in Texas, Mexico, and
Canada was likely to have been the outbreak in Kenya. 
Virus transmission may have occurred through contact
with international travelers in airports or during transit
because epidemiologic investigations did not detect other
measles cases in Cabo San Lucas or Texas. The exception
to possible air travel–related exposure was the single case
that occurred in Canada. This patient had traveled by car,
although investigations found no measles cases in the areas
visited: Bangor, Maine (December 2); Boston,
Massachusetts (December 3–6); and Portsmouth, New
Hampshire (December 6). Two refugees from Eastleigh
settled in a state visited by the Canadian patient. They
entered Massachusetts on November 10, 2005, and by 21
days after arrival, measles had not developed. However, a
measles outbreak was detected in southern Germany in
January 2006 (9), and the viral sequence matched that of
the Kenya outbreak virus (Figure; MVs/Stuttgart.DEU/
4.06), which indicates that the source of this outbreak was
also likely to have been Kenya. Therefore, B3 viruses with
identical sequences could have been introduced into Texas,
Mexico, or Canada by travelers infected with B3 virus in
Europe.
Conclusions
Although genotype B3 has been the most frequently
detected measles genotype in western and central Africa
(4, 10–12), ours is the first report of the detection of geno-
type B3 in Kenya. Moreover, the sequence from a virus
isolated in Nigeria in June 2005 (Figure; MVs/Yola.NIE/
25.05) was identical to the sequences in the Kenya out-
break group. Although a link has not been established
between Nigeria and Kenya, a survey of measles geno-
types in Kenya in 2002 detected only genotype D4 viruses
(13). Sequences of viruses isolated during 2004 and 2005
from Côte d’Ivoire and Benin (this study) were included in
our analysis (Figure) because these B3 sequences repre-
sent closely related viruses from western Africa.
The analysis and dissemination of viral sequences from
measles cases led to the identification of an unrecognized
epidemiologic link at an airport and linked sporadic cases
in 4 countries that do not have endemic measles to an
ongoing outbreak in Kenya. Investigators in the field need
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Figure. A) Dendrogram showing the relationships among the
measles reference strains representing the 23 known measles
genotypes (B3 has 2 reference strains). Clade B (circled) is
expanded in panel B. B) Midpoint-rooted maximum parsimony tree
of nucleoprotein genes (450 nt) of measles viruses from patients
in the United States, Mexico, the Netherlands, Canada, and Kenya
during 2005 and 2006. The unrooted tree includes sequences
from Nigeria in 2005, Germany in 2006, Côte d’Ivoire in 2004, and
Benin in 2005 (sequences in bold, this study) as well as selected
B3 sequences available from GenBank for comparison. GenBank
accession numbers are shown in parentheses. The identical
sequences from the “Kenya Outbreak Group” are represented by
Genbank accession number DQ888751, MVi/New Jersey.USA/
45.05. The GenBank numbers for the sequence from Benin (BEN)
and the 3 sequences from Côte d’Ivoire (CIV) are EF031461,
EF031458, EF031459, and EF031460. *Collected from the
Dagoretti area of Nairobi; the other Nairobi sequences were from
cases in the Eastleigh area.to collect adequate specimens for virus isolation. Timely
communication of sequence data among epidemiologists
and microbiologists is critical for identifying possible links
among sporadic cases of measles. The potential for rapid
transmission of measles during brief encounters with
international travelers underscores the importance of glob-
al surveillance of measles virus.
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